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Abstract
We elucidate the dynamics of ongoing collective action among intentional agents with diverse
beliefs and imperfect information. Their decisions on whether or not to contribute to the collective
good depend not only on the past but also on their expectations as to how their actions will affect
those of others. We show that in attempts at collective action the onset of overall cooperation can
take place in a sudden and unexpected way. Likewise, defection can appear out of nowhere in
very large, previously cooperating groups. These outbreaks mark the end of long transient states
in which defection or cooperation persists in groups that cannot sustain it indefinitely. Computer
experiments demonstrate these predictions, as well as verifying that diversity of beliefs among
individuals acts as an additional source of uncertainty, instigating the outbreaks.
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1 Introduction
Collective action problems create difficult quandaries for societies, be they social,
economic, or organizational. Whenever a group of intentional agents collaborates in a
collective task that produces some overall utility to the group, the potential for a dilemma
arises. In cases where the gain to an individual for collaborating is less then its cost for
participating, it may rationally choose not to cooperate and instead to free ride on the
effort of others. When this logic holds for all individuals, no sustained cooperation
ensues. The problem occurs when the benefit to be accrued by overall cooperation
offsets individual costs, since rationality on the part of each individual leads to failure in
achieving a collective good beneficial to all. The resolution of such dilemmas, which are
the subject of study in the social sciences [1–6], underlies successful attempts at ongoing
collective action, such as the functioning of large organizations, the adoption of new
technologies [7], and the mobilization of political movements [8].
In human societies, an essential element contributing to the likelihood of collective
action is that individuals differ from each other both in their beliefs and in their estimates
of the costs and benefits of contributing to the collective good. Thus, whereas one
individual might decide to participate in the group effort on the basis of a few others
having joined, another might wait until many others have already done so. This diversity
comes into play in many instances of collective action.
In studying collective action one may then ask the following question: if agents
make decisions on whether or not to cooperate on the basis of imperfect information
about the group activity, and incorporate expectations on how their decision will affect
other agents, can overall cooperation be sustained for long periods of time? Moreover,
how do expectations, diversity of beliefs, and group size affect cooperation?
Collective action problems are characterized by the impossibility of exclusion; that
is, no member of a group engaged in collective action can be excluded from enjoying
the benefits of the group’s efforts. On the other hand, collective goods can have varying
amounts of jointness of supply, which is the degree to which one agent’s consumption
of the good does not reduce the amount available to any other. The amount of jointness
determines in part the dependence of cooperative outcomes on the size of the group
[5]. Thus, for example, some studies have shown that overall cooperation is undermined
as the group increases in size [1, 9], others that, to the contrary, that it is more likely
for larger groups [8]. The latter result was obtained for public goods, a special subset
exhibiting perfect jointness of supply, while the former holds for divisible goods, those
with limited jointness of supply. In this paper, we consider divisible collective goods.
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Regardless of whether or not a group of a given size can exhibit ongoing cooperation,
there remains the issue of how is it that such a state is reached, if ever. For one can
imagine situations whereby a group initially exhibits cooperative behavior in spite of its
being too large to do so, only to gradually evolve into collective defection. Conversely,
a large non-cooperative group could undergo a drastic reduction in size and the relevant
question then becomes how long before the switch to global cooperation occurs.
In order to answer these questions, we present and study a dynamical model of
ongoing collective action among intentional agents whose choices depend not only on
the past but also on their expectations as to how their actions will affect those of others. In
this model agents act on the basis of information that can be uncertain at times. We show
that under these conditions the onset of overall cooperation can take place in a sudden
and unexpected way. Likewise, defection can appear out of nowhere in very large,
previously cooperating groups. These outbreaks mark the end of long transient states
in which defection or cooperation persists in groups that cannot sustain it indefinitely.
Moreover, we study the effects of diversity on these phenomena. First of all, we find
that diversity acts as an additional source of uncertainty, thus shortening the time to an
outbreak. Also, we show that when several subgroups with different beliefs are merged
into a larger group, overall cooperation (or defection) can appear in stages.
Following a long tradition [10, 3, 9], in Section 2 we study the free rider problem
as a repeated n-person prisoners’ dilemma, wherein the benefit obtained by an individual
from cooperating in producing the good is outweighed by the cost of cooperation for the
one-shot game. We recast the interaction as an asynchronous dynamic game in which
each individual reconsiders its decision at an average reevaluation rate , using delayed
information of the level of provision of the good. The iterated game is of finite duration,
and individuals decide to cooperate or defect by determining which choice maximizes
their expected share of the good for the remainder of the game. In addition, uncertainty
is introduced into the relation between individual effort and group performance to model
imperfect information and bounded rationality. The incorporation of diversity into the
model is left until Section 4, so that its effects may be more apparent.
The type of expectations that we consider consist of two components: each indi-
vidual believes (1) that future aggregate collective behavior is directly influenced by the
individual’s choices in inverse proportion to the group size; and (2) that the interaction
is of finite duration characterized by a horizon length, H. Thus, individuals believe that
in the long run their actions encourage similar actions on the part of others in the group.
There are various mechanisms by which this might occur: imitation and establishment
of conventions or norms are a few. In addition, individuals believe that the ability of
their actions to encourage like actions increases with the number of individuals who have
chosen to contribute to the collective good (as opposed to free riding). In some sense,
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this reflects a belief that contributing individuals form a core group whose reactions are
much more sensitive to fluctuations in the amount of the good produced.
We show that an individually rational strategy of conditional cooperation emerges
from the individuals’ expectations and beliefs. Individuals cooperate if they perceive the
fraction cooperating to be greater than some critical amount and defect otherwise. This
strategy of conditional cooperation is reminiscent of the successful tit-for-tat strategy in
2–player prisoners’ dilemma in which a player cooperates if and only if its opponent
cooperated in the previous turn and defects otherwise [11].
In Section 3, we analyze the dynamics of fluctuations away from Nash equilibria
using a thermodynamic-like formalism [12] for uniform groups without diversity. Besides
confirming that there exists a critical group size beyond which cooperation is not
sustainable [1, 9], we find additional, intriguing effects. Our results reveal several
different dynamical regimes that should be observable as the size of a group changes.
In one regime, although cooperation may persist for very long times even for groups
exceeding a critical size, group behavior eventually decays to overall defection. In
another situation a system can be stuck in a non-cooperative state even though its size is
well below that guaranteeing long term cooperation. These effects are shown to depend
strongly on the degree of uncertainty pervading the system, as well as on the length of
the individual’s horizons. To confirm our analytical predictions, we present the results
of computer simulations.1
In Section 4 we study the effect of diversity among individuals on the phenomena
described in Section 3. We find that without changing the critical sizes for cooperation,
diversity acts a source of additional uncertainty and shortens the transition time to the
long-term stable state of the system. In fact, an analytical form for the increase in
uncertainty due to diversity is given. Again, computer simulations are invoked which
confirm our predictions. Moreover, these simulations also show that when there is
diversity of beliefs among subgroups merged to form a large group, cooperation can
be achieved in stages.
Section 5 summarizes our results.
1 The interested reader is referred Glance and Huberman [13] for additional technical detail beyond that provided in
this paper.
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2 The Dynamics of Collective Action
The economics of free riding
We consider the ongoing group interaction involved in the production of a non-
excludable collective good which exhibits limited jointness of supply. Each individual
can either contribute (cooperate) to the production of the good, or not (defect). While no
individual can directly observe the effort of another, each member observes instead the
collective output and can deduce overall group participation using knowledge of indi-
vidual and group production functions. We also introduce an amount of uncertainty into
the relation between members’ efforts and group performance. There are many possible
causes for this uncertainty [9]; for example, a member may try but fail to contribute due
to unforeseen obstacles. Alternatively, another type of uncertainty might arise due to
individuals with bounded rationality occasionally making suboptimal decisions [14, 15].
In any case, we treat here only idiosyncratic disturbances or errors, whose occurrences
are purely uncorrelated.
Consequently, we assume that a group member intending to participate does so
successfully with probability p. The individual’s attempt to cooperate, instead of guaran-
teeing contribution to the cause, fails with probability 1 p, with an effect equivalent to
a defection. The inverse scenario holds for members intending to defect: an attempt to
defect results in zero contribution with probability q, but with probability 1 q a defecting
member will inadvertently (or suboptimally) contribute to the collective good. Then, as
all attempts are uncorrelated, the number of successfully cooperating members, bnc; is a
mixture of two binomial random variables with mean < bnc >= pnc + (1  q)(n  nc);
where nc is the number of members attempting to cooperate within a group of size n.
The limit p and q equal to 1 corresponds to an error-free world of complete
information, while p and q equal to 0.5 reflect the case where the effect of an action
is completely divorced from intent. Note that whenever p and q deviate from 1,
the perceived level of cooperation will differ from the actual attempted amount of
participation.
In the simplest case, collective benefits increase linearly in the contributions of the
members, at a rate b per cooperating member. Each contributing individual bears a
personal cost, c. Let ki denote whether member i is cooperating (ki=1) or defecting
(ki=0). Then the utility at time t for member i is
Ui(t) =
b
n
bnc(t)  cki: (2.1)
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Using its knowledge of the functional form of the utility function2, each individual
can deduce the number of individuals effectively cooperating at some time t by inverting
Eq. 2.1:
bnc(t) = n
b
(Ui(t) + cki): (2.2)
Of course, this estimation will differ from the actual number of individuals intending
to cooperate in a manner described by the mixture of two binomial distributions. We
also define bfc(t); to denote the fraction, bnc(t)=n; of individuals effectively cooperating
at time t.
When all members contribute successfully, each receives net benefits bn=n c = b c:
The production of the collective good becomes an n-person prisoners’ dilemma when
b > c >
b
n
: (2.3)
Thus, although the good of all is maximized when everyone cooperates (b  c > 0); the
dominant strategy in the one-shot game is to defect since additional gain of personal
participation is less than the private cost (b=n  c < 0):
The logic behind the decision to cooperate or not changes when the interaction is
ongoing since future expected utility gains will join present ones in influencing the rational
individual’s decision to contribute or not to the collective good. In particular, individual
expectations concerning the future evolution of the game can play a significant role in
each member’s decisions. The importance individuals place on the future depends on
how long they expect the interaction to last. If they expect the game to end soon, then,
rationally, future expected returns should be discounted heavily with respect to known
immediate returns. On the other hand, if the interaction is likely to continue for a long
time, then members may be wise to discount the future only slightly and make choices
that maximize their returns on the long run. Notice that making present choices that
depend on the future is rational only if, and to the extent that, a member believes its
choices influence the decisions others make.
In the next section we elaborate on one self-consistent set of beliefs that permits
individuals engaged in ongoing collective action to make the decision whether or not
to contribute.
2 For a justification of the form of the individual utility function in the context of either divisible goods or pure public
goods see [9].
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Expectations
The time scale of the interaction is set by the rate, , at which members of the group
reexamine their choices. Information about the level of cooperation is deduced from
individual utility accrued in the past, as per Eq. 2.2, and is thus delayed by an interval
 . Along with expectations about the future, the two parameters,  and bfc; the fraction
observed as cooperating, determine how individuals expect the level of cooperation to
evolve in time.
For simplicity we assume all members of the group share a common rationality
in their method of forming expectations. Specifically, all members expect the game to
be of finite duration H, the horizon length3. Thus, future returns expected at a time
t0 from the present are discounted at a rate e t0=H with respect to immediate expected
returns. Secondly, each member expects that their choice of action, when reflected
in the net benefits received by the others, will influence future levels of cooperation.
Since, however, the decision of one individual affects others’ returns by an increment
or decrement of only b=n; each member perceives its influence as decreasing with
increasing group size. Furthermore, individual changes in strategy are believed to be
most effective in encouraging similar behavior when levels of cooperation are high. We
postulate that these two effects compound so that each member expects its decision to
cooperate or defect to encourage an overall growth or decay in the level of cooperation
at a rate proportional to the ratio bfc=n: Roughly, then, a member expects its cooperative
(defecting) action to stimulate an additional bfc=n members to cooperate (defect) during
each subsequent time period.4
A mathematical formulation of the manner in which cooperation encourages coop-
eration and defection encourages defection with nice asymptotic properties now follows.
Let  bfc(t + t0) denote the expected future difference (at time t + t0) between the frac-
tion of agents cooperating and the fraction of those defecting. Member i’s choice itself
causes an instantaneous difference at t0 = 0 of  bfc(t; t0 = 0) = 1=n: To reflect member
i’s expectation that during subsequent time steps (of average duration 1/), its action will
encourage bfc=n additional members per time step to behave likewise, we stipulate that
the difference  bfc(t+ t0) approach 1 asymptotically from its initial value 1/n at some
given rate. For the purposes of simplicity we will set this rate equal to e bfc(t )t0=n;
3 The concept of a horizon is formally related to a discount , which reflects the perceived probability that the game
will continue through the next time step. The two are connected through the relation
1P
i=0
i ()!
1R
0
dt0 e t
0=H () which
implies H = 11  :
4 Assigning a functional form to individual expectations, although somewhat arbitrary, is necessary to study dynamics.
Variations on the same theme, however, can be seen to yield similar dynamics, provided that the rate at which similar
behavior is expected to encourage similar behavior rises monotonically in the ratio bfc=n:
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which corresponds to the following deviation:
 bfc t + t0 = 1  (1  1=n) exp   bfc(t   )
n
t0
!
: (2.4)
We should point out that variations on the precise functional form of the expected
deviation  bfc(t+ t0) would simply cause to the deviation to grow faster or slower with
increasing t0; without yielding significant qualitative changes in the types of dynamical
behavior characterizing the interaction.
In summary, member i reevaluates its decision whether or not to contribute to the
production of the good at an average rate , using its knowledge of bfc(t   ) and
following its expectations about the future. Using its prediction of how it expects fc to
evolve in relation to its choice and discounting the future appropriately, member i then
makes its decision on whether to cooperate or defect.
Putting it all together, member i perceives the advantage of cooperating over defect-
ing at time t to be the net benefit
 bBi(t) = H(b  c)  Hb(n  1)
n +H bfc(t  ) : (2.5)
Member i cooperates when  bBi(t) > 0; defects when  bBi(t) < 0; and chooses at
random between defection and cooperation when  bBi(t) = 0; basing its decision on the
fraction of the group it perceives to have cooperated at a time  in the past, bfc(t   ):
These criteria reduce to the following condition for cooperation at time t:
fcrit  1
H

nc  b
b  c

< bfc(t  ): (2.6)
Since bfc(t  ) is a mixture of two binomially distributed variables, Eq. 2.6 provides
a full prescription of the stochastic evolution for the interaction. In particular, member
i cooperates with probability Pc(fc(t  )) that it perceives cooperation as maximizing
its expected future accumulated utility, given the actual attempted level of cooperation
fc(t  ):
Thus, the individuals engage in conditional cooperation, cooperating when the
fraction perceived as cooperating is greater than the critical amount, fcrit and defecting
8
when the perceived fraction cooperating is less than fcrit. Because of the nature of the
individuals’ expectations, this behavior, reminiscent of a generalized tit-for-tat, emerges
from individually rational choices. In this way, conditional cooperation is a rational
strategy. Furthermore, conditional cooperation is a more general type of strategy than
might be expected from the explicit specification of the individuals’ beliefs. As a result,
it holds for a wider range of models than considered here, once one allows for variation
in the functional form of fcrit:
Group behavior
A deterministic continuous version of the stochastic discrete interaction specified
above can be obtained assuming: (1) the size, n, of the group is large; and (2) the
average value of a function of some variable is well approximated by the value of the
function at the average of that variable. The model developed below will be useful in
discovering the Nash equilibria and determining their stability characteristics.
From this point on, we specialize to the symmetric case p = q; in which an individual
is equally likely to effectively defect when intending to cooperate as to cooperate when
intending to defect. (Later we will comment on the effect of this restriction on the
generalizability of our results.) By the Central Limit Theorem, for large n, the random
variable bfc tends in law to a Gaussian distribution with mean h bfci = pfc+(1  p)(1  fc)
and variance 2 = p(1  p)=n: Under our assumptions, the mean probability thatbfc > fcrit thus becomes
c(fc) =
1
2
(
1 + erf
"
h bfci   fcritp
2
#)
: (2.7)
The evolution of the number of agents cooperating in time is then described by the
dynamical equation [16]
dfc
dt
=  [fc(t)  c(fc(t  ))]; (2.8)
where  is the reevaluation rate and  is the delay parameter, as defined earlier.
The equilibrium points f0c of the interaction described by the above equation are
obtained by setting the right hand side to zero5. In this case they are given by the
5 Furthermore, linear stability analysis of Eq. 2.8 shows that the stability of the equilibrium points is independent of
the value of the delay  , and of the reevaluation rate . Thus, the asymptotic behavior of the group interaction does not
depend on the delay. Moreover, the equilibrium points belong to one of two types: stable fixed point attractors or unstable
fixed point repellors, due to the linearity of the condition for cooperation (Eq. 2.6).
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solutions to

 
f0c

= f0c : (2.9)
Solving the above equation yields the critical sizes beyond which cooperation can
no longer be sustained. In the case of perfect certainty (p=q=1), these critical sizes
can be expressed in simple analytical form. Thus, a group will no longer sustain global
cooperation if it exceeds a value n given by
n = H

b
c
  1

+
b
c
: (2.10)
Similarly, cooperation is the only possible global outcome if the group size falls below
a second critical size nmin:
nmin =
b
2c
+
1
2c
p
b2 + 4Hc(b  c): (2.11)
Notice that these two critical sizes are not equal; in other words, there is a range of sizes
between nmin and n for which either cooperation or defection is a possible outcome,
depending on the initial conditions.
An estimate of the possible sizes can be obtained, for example, if one assumes a
horizon H=50 (which corresponds to a termination probability =0.98), =1, b=2.5
and c=1. In this case one obtains n = 77 and nmin = 10, a significant group size.
Observe that an increase in the horizon length would lead to corresponding increases in
the critical sizes.
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3 The Critical Mass
The 
 function formalism
The model studied in the previous section dealt with the average properties of a
collection of agents having to choose between cooperation and defection. Since the
asymptotic behavior generated by the dynamics was in the form of Nash equilibria
or fixed points, it is of interest to ask about the evolution of fluctuations away from
equilibrium state in the presence of uncertainty. These fluctuations are important for two
reasons: (1) the time necessary for the system to relax back to equilibrium after small
departures in the number of agents cooperating or defecting might be long compared to
the time-scale of the collective task to be performed, or the measuring time of an outside
observer; (2) large enough fluctuations in the number of defecting or collaborating agents
can shift the state of the system from cooperating to defecting and vice-versa. If that is
the case, it becomes important to know how probable these large fluctuations are, and
how they evolve in time.
In what follows we will use a formalism introduced by Ceccatto and Huberman
[12] that is well suited for studying fluctuations away from the equilibrium behavior of
the system. This formalism relies on the existence of an optimality function, 
, that
can be constructed from knowledge of the density dependent utilities. This function has
the important property that its local minima give the Nash equilibria of the system as
the most probable configurations of the system. Depending on the complexity of the
function, several Nash equilibria can exist, with the overall global minimum producing
the optimal state of the system.
Specifically, the equilibrium probability distribution Pe(fc) is given by
Pe = C exp [ n
(fc)]; (3.1)
where the optimality function 
 for our model of ongoing collective action is given by

(fc) =
fcZ
0
df 0c

f 0c   c
 
f 0c
 (3.2)
in terms of the mean probability c(fc) that cooperation is preferred. Thus, the optimal
configuration corresponds to the value of fc at which 
 reaches its global minimum.
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Within this formalism it is easy to study the dynamics of fluctuations away from
these minima. First, consider the case where there is a single Nash equilibrium (which
can be either cooperative or defecting). As was shown, fluctuations away from this state
relax back exponentially fast to the equilibrium point, with a characteristic time of the
order of 1/, which is the average evaluation time for the individuals. Second, and more
interestingly, is the situation when there are multiple Nash equilibria, with the global
minimum of the 
 function denoting the optimal state of the system. This is illustrated
schematically in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Schematic sketch of the optimality function 
 vs. fc, the fraction of agents cooperation. The global
minimum is at A, local minimum at B. h is the barrier height separating state B from A.
If the system is initially in a Nash equilibrium which corresponds to the global
minimum (e.g., state A), fluctuations away from this state will relax back exponentially
fast to that state. But if the system is initially trapped in a metastable state (state B),
i.e., a minimum which is not the global one, the dynamics away from this state is both
more complicated and interesting. As was shown by Ceccatto and Huberman, whereas
for short times fluctuations away from the local minimum relax back to it, for longer
times a giant fluctuation can take place, whereby a large fraction of the agents switching
strategies can push the system over the barrier maximum. Once this critical mass is
reached, the remaining agents rapidly switch into the new strategy that corresponds to
the optimal Nash equilibrium and the system slides into the optimal state.
The time scales over which this whole process takes place is also of interest, for the
time to nucleate a giant fluctuation is exponential in the number of agents. However,
when such transitions take place, they do so very rapidly — the total time it takes for all
agents to do the crossing is logarithmic in the number of agents. Since the logarithm of
a large number is very small when compared to an exponential of the same number, the
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theory predicts that nothing much happens for long times, but when it does, it happens
very fast.
The process of escaping from the metastable state depends on the amount of imperfect
knowledge that individuals have about the state of the system, in other words, on what
other agents are doing. In the absence of imperfect knowledge the system would always
stay in the local minimum downhill from the initial conditions, since small excursions
away from it by a few agents would reduce their utility. It is only in the case of imperfect
knowledge that many individuals can change their behavior. This is because, in evaluating
the number of members cooperating, imperfect knowledge amounts to occasional large
errors in the individual’s estimation of the actual number cooperating.
Results of Monte Carlo simulations, which were conducted in asynchronous fashion,
confirm these theoretical predictions. Each individual decides to cooperate or defect
based on the criterion given in Eq. 2.6. Uncertainty enters since these decisions are
based on perceived levels of cooperation which differ from the actual attempted amount
of cooperation in a way distributed as a mixture of binomials.
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Fig. 2. At t=0, two cooperating groups of size n=6 merge to form a larger, cooperating group of size n=12.
All agents have horizon length H=9.5, with p=0.93, b=2.5, c=1, =1, and =1. For these parameters,
cooperation is the optimal state for a group of size n=6, but for the combined group of size n=12, cooperation
is metastable. Indeed, as the figure shows, metastable cooperation persists for almost 4,000 time steps in this
example. The average crossover time is about 5,000 time steps, ranging from less than 1,000 to over 10,000
time steps. Uncertainty (p less than one) ensures that eventually a large fluctuation in the perceived number
of agents cooperating eventually takes the group over into a state of mutual defection, which is optimal.
For example, consider two small cooperating groups of size n=6, with horizon length
H=9.5, for which the optimal state (i.e., the global minimum of the optimality function)
is cooperation, that merge at t=0 to form a larger, cooperating group of size n=12. For
the larger group, cooperation is now a metastable state: no one individual will find it to
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its benefit to defect and the metastable cooperative state can be maintained for very long
times, especially if p is close to 1. As shown in Fig. 2, in this one case mutual cooperation
lasts for about 4000 time steps, until a sudden transition (of duration proportional to the
logarithm of the size of the group) to mutual defection occurs, from which the system
will almost never recover (the time scale of recovery is many orders of magnitude larger
than the crossover time).
Determining the average time that it takes for the group to crossover to the global
minimum is a calculation analogous to particle decay in a bistable potential and has been
performed many times [17]. The time, t, that it takes for a group of size n to cross over
from a metastable Nash equilibrium to the optimal one is given by
t = constant enh=; (3.3)
with h the height of the barrier as shown in Fig. 1 and  a measure of the imperfectness
of the individuals’ knowledge. We should point out, however, that in our model the
barrier height itself also depends on n, H, and p, making simple analytical estimates of
the crossover time considerably more difficult.
Further simulations of the example given above show that the average crossover time
in that case is about 5,000 time steps, although it can range from less than 1,000 to over
10,000 time steps. The exponential dependence of the crossover time on the amount
of uncertainty can be seen by running the same system, but with different amounts of
error. In the example above, p equals 0.93. However, if the amount of error increases
so that p now equals 0.91, say (thus reducing the height of barrier between cooperation
and defection by 21%), the crossover to defection typically occurs within hundreds of
time steps, instead of thousands.
Critical sizes for cooperation
The optimality function reveals much of what we wish to know concerning the
dynamics of a system engaged in a collective action problem: it gives the possible Nash
equilibria and predicts the long-term stable state, i.e., the state that corresponds to the
global minimum. It also shows that as the size of the group changes, the relative depths
of 
’s minima change, leading to new optimal states.
Eq. 2.6 implies that fcrit increases with increasing n. As a result, the value of fcrit
passes from fcrit < 0:5 to fcrit > 0:5 as n increases. This indicates a transition in the
dynamical nature of the interaction: as n increases, the interaction switches from having
an optimal state of mutual cooperation to having an optimal state of mutual defection.
These transition points were derived exactly for p=1 and numerically for p<1.
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As p decreases from 1, numerical analysis of 
(fc) shows that the shape of the
optimality function is roughly preserved, but that the barrier height decreases with
decreasing p. The peak drifts away from fc = fcrit (except in the special case fcrit=0.5),
while the minima may move in from fc = 0 and fc = 1: Eventually, as p is decreased
further, the barrier height goes to zero at some pcrit, and only one minimum remains.
Until p reaches the critical value pcrit at which the barrier height goes to zero for all n,
the nature of the system’s equilibrium points remain similar to the p=1 case. Specifically,
for p < pcrit; three critical values can be obtained: (1) nmin(p); the minimum group size
below which cooperation is the only fixed point; (2) ~n(p); the critical size below which
cooperation is the optimal state; and (3) n(p); an upper bound above which cooperation
is not sustainable. The values nmin(p); ~n(p); and n(p) can be determined numerically,
demonstrating the emergence of four levels in group size corresponding to very different
resolutions of the collective action problem:
n  nmin(p) one equilibrium point – mostly cooperative;
nmin(p) < n  ~n(p) mostly cooperative optimal state, mostly defecting
metastable state;
~n(p) < n < n(p) mostly defecting optimal state, mostly cooperative
metastable state;
n  n(p) one equilibrium point – mostly defecting.
Analysis of the optimality function yields the values nmin(p); ~n(p); and n(p); along
with pcrit. These values were found for the case H=50 (which corresponds to discount
rate  = 1  1H = 0:98), =1, =1, benefit to group of individual cooperation b=2.5, and
personal cost of cooperation c=1. The resulting phase diagram delineating the regions of
different resolutions to the conflict is shown in Fig. 3. At p=1, n = 77; ~n = 40; and
nmin = 10: When p > pcrit = 0:59; the uncertainty is high enough that all structure in
the optimality function is washed out and only one equilibrium point exists for group of
all sizes. For groups of size less than 40 operating within such a high level of uncertainty,
the interaction evolves to a mixed equilibrium that is more cooperative than defective.
The balance reverses itself when the group size exceeds 40.
The diagram in Fig. 3 shows that for the symmetric case p = q; n(p) is a decreasing
function of p while nmin(p) is an increasing function of p and ~n(p) is a constant. In
general (q 6= p); n(p) remains a decreasing function; however, the functional forms of
~n(p) and nmin(p) depend on q. For example, q=0 yields decreasing functions ~n(p)
and nmin(p):
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Fig. 3. Diagram delineates regions corresponding to different resolutions of collective action problem for
parameter values H=50 and =1. The amount of error, , increases vertically, and the size of the group
increases horizontally. In region 1, n  nmin(p); there is one equilibrium point – mostly cooperative;
in region 2, nmin(p) < n < ~n(p); mostly cooperative is the optimal state, while mostly defecting is a
metastable state; in region 3, n = ~n(p);the system is bistable with mostly cooperative and mostly defecting
both optimal states; in region 4, ~n(p) < n < n(p); mostly defecting is the optimal state, while mostly
cooperative is a metastable state; and in region 5, n(p)  n; there is again only one equilibrium point –
mostly defecting. There is no sharp boundary between regions 1 and 5 for high levels of uncertainty. Note
that region 3 actually has zero width.
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4 Diversity and Cooperation
In the first pass at studying collective action problems, we treated all individuals
as identical. We now drop that assumption and consider how diversity enters and how
behavior changes as a result. As we discuss below, two qualitatively different forms
of diversity must be studied. The first type reflects diversity in groups of agents whose
differences in beliefs can be captured by a simple spread about some common belief.
Thus, the individuals on the whole are similar, but have differences that capture variability
in preferences and other additional factors. For example, each group member might be
said to have horizon length H = 10  2; instead of H=10 exactly.
On the other hand, the second type of diversity represents differences within a group
that cannot be accounted for by a simple variance about an average value. Instead
the group acts as the union of several subgroups each characterized by its own set of
beliefs. In this case, one subgroup might have horizon length H=2, another H=4, and
yet another H=6.
A general way of incorporating diversity is to allow the critical fraction, fcrit; in
the criterion for cooperation (Eq. 2.6) to vary from individual to individual. Thus, each
member i has a bias bi, and decides whether or not cooperate based on the revised
condition
fcrit + bi < bfc(t  ): (4.1)
The notation we use to denote the biased value of the critical fraction will be f bicrit 
fcrit + bi.
Diversity as a form of uncertainty
We examine first the case in which the group’s diversity can be modeled by a
Gaussian distribution. If we take the biases {bi} to be distributed normally with mean
zero, then the critical size beyond which cooperation cannot be maintained remains the
same as without diversity. Distributions with non-zero mean would alter the nature of
the equilibrium points; so zero mean distributions offer the best means to isolate the
effect of adding diversity.
In addition, the distribution of biases {bi} can be used to represent a diversity in
the individuals’ horizons or in their benefit-cost ratios b/c as long as   fcrit:. Thus,
describing diversity by adding a bias to the criterion for cooperation of Eq. 2.6 is a more
general description of diversity than might appear at first glance.
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In order to understand the qualitative effect of introducing diversity in this manner,
we write the mean probability ic(fc) that member i will choose to cooperate as
ic(fc) =
1
2
(
1 + erf
"
h bfci   (fcrit + bi)p
2
#)
; (4.2)
where h bfci = pfc + (1  p)(1  fc) and  = pp(1  p)=n: The dynamical equation
describing the evolution of the system then becomes
dfc
dt
=  
"
fc(t)  1
n
nX
i=1
ic(fc(t   ))
#
: (4.3)
Letting
~c(fc) =
1
n
nX
i=1
ic(fc(t   )): (4.4)
and linearizing about h bfci = fcrit; we obtain
~c(fc) =
1
2
(
1 + erf
"
h bfci   fcritp
2~
#)
; (4.5)
with the renormalized value of uncertainty ~ given by
~ !
p
2 + 02: (4.6)
This approximation assumes that the {bi} are distributed normally with mean zero and
standard deviation 0:
Thus, taking this first form of diversity into account simply renormalizes the amount
of noise in the system as parametrized by  in the denominator of the error function.
Note, however, that imperfect information also enters in the calculation of the expected
value of fc: h bfci = pfc+(1  p)(1  fc): Consequently, adding diversity is not identical
to decreasing p away from 1.
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From this analysis, it appears that diversity among the agents will shorten the lifetime
of the metastable states described in the previous section, while the transitions remain
abrupt. Computer experiments verify this prediction, with a sample simulation given
in Fig. 4. Diversity is modeled as a spread about fcrit among the agents; thus, agents
differ from one another in their likelihood of cooperating vs. defecting. In this example,
the individual biases to fcrit are distributed normally with standard deviation set equal
to the amount due to imperfect information

0   =pp(1  p)=n. As a result of
the diversity among the individuals in the group, the average crossover time becomes
about 1,300 time steps, ranging from fewer than 100 time steps to over 2,000. Without
diversity, the average crossover time is about 5,000 time steps (see, for example, Fig. 2
— note in particular the difference in time scales), ranging from less than 1,000 time
steps to over 10,000.
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Fig. 4. Group of size n=12, with H=9.5, p=0.93, b=2.5, c=1, =1, and =1 with diversity. Diversity is
modeled by adding individual biases to the value of fcrit = 0:6667. These biases are distributed normally
with mean zero and standard deviation 0   = pp(1  p)=n (the “noise” due to diversity is set equal
to the noise due to uncertainty). The moderate amount of diversity is responsible for a transition rate to
defection about four times as fast as that for a uniform group (see, for example, Fig. 2 — note the difference
in time scales).
Stages to cooperation
We next consider the second form of diversity, representing large differences in
beliefs between various subgroups within a group. This type of diversity follows a
multimodal distribution and does not lend itself to the renormalization of uncertainty
performed above. Instead, the summed error function in Eq. 4.3 exhibits a sequence
of steps. For example, if in a group of size 12 there is one subgroup biased towards
cooperation with f b1crit = 0:1333; another with f
b2
crit = 0:4667 and yet another biased
towards defection with f b3crit = 0:8; then there are three steps in the summed error
function of Eq. 4.4. Each step represents the likelihood that an individual from each
respective subgroup will find it worthwhile to cooperate. There can now be multiple
local minima in which some of the subgroups sustain cooperation while the others do
not. As always, the global minimum is the long-term preferred state of the system.
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In the example given in the preceding paragraph, overall cooperation can be achieved
in step-wise fashion. If the group begins in an uncooperative state, the subgroup with
f b1crit = 0:1333 is the first to make the transition to cooperation, followed by the subgroup
with f b2crit = 0:4667 and finally by the subgroup with f
b3
crit = 0:8: These steps can be
seen in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Stages towards cooperation. A group of size 12 consists of three subgroups. The first is greatly
biased towards cooperation with fb1crit = 0:1333: The second subgroup has f
b2
crit = 0:4667; while the third
is biased towards defection with fb3crit = 0:8: The figure shows the stepwise transition to mutual cooperation:
each subgroup makes the transition to cooperation in turn. Parameter values are p=0.98, b=2.5, c=1, n=12,
and H=12.
Compare this example to the uniform case in which all individuals have fcrit =
0:4667 (the average critical fraction for the diverse group above). This system is now
almost bistable, with both cooperation and defection about equally likely to be the long-
term stable state, although cooperation is more likely. In this scenario, then, diversity
greatly increases the likelihood of attaining a cooperative state. Other scenarios can be
envisioned, however, which accomplish the reverse, making defection more likely with
diversity than without.
Another interesting consequence of the effect of multimodal diversity is the follow-
ing. Imagine combining two groups, each composed of 6 individuals. The first group has
beliefs such that all members have f bcrit = 0:3667: Thus, the long-term stable state for
this group is one of cooperation. The second group, on the other hand, is unbiased with
fcrit = 0:6667; and thus tends towards mutual defection. Putting these groups together,
then, we have an initial state with 6 of the 12 individuals cooperating. This turns out to
be a metastable state of the combined system. Eventually, however, the group undergoes
a transition to either complete cooperation or complete defection. Both are equally likely
— the two possibilities are illustrated in Fig. 6. Thus, either the defecting agents are
persuaded to cooperate (although they generally wouldn’t when in a group to themselves
even though the size of this subgroup is smaller); or the originally cooperating agents
lose their incentive to do so and defect.
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Fig. 6. Two groups of size 6 are joined together, one with a bias towards cooperation

f b1crit = 0:3667

;
the second with a tendency to defect. (fcrit = 0:6333). Thus, the long-term state for the first group on its
own is cooperation, while the long-term state for the second is defection. Combining the two groups with
the six agents biases towards cooperation initially cooperating and the second six defecting, the figures show
that overall behavior can go either way. The initial state is itself metastable, but fluctuations insure that
eventually the group will go over to either mutual cooperation or mutual defection, with both possibilities
equally likely. Either the defecting agents are swept over into cooperation or the cooperative agents collapse
into defection. Parameter values are p=0.99, b=2.5, c=1, n=12, H=12.
This example invites comparison to the situation in which all members have fcrit =
0:5666: Such a group would be nearly bistable, although with a long-term tendency
towards defection. A group with initially half its members cooperating would most of
time evolve rapidly to a state of mutual defection. With diversity as above, on the other
hand, the two stable states of defection and cooperation become separated by a metastable
state in which half of the group cooperates, and the group can now remain stuck in a
situation in which half of the group free rides on the other half. For this particular choice
of diversity, transitions to either overall cooperation or defection are equally likely. Thus,
the diversity in the group has improved the group’s chances of mutual cooperation over
those of a uniform group with the same average fcrit:
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5 Discussion
In this paper we presented and studied a model of ongoing collective action among
intentional agents which make choices that depend not only to the past but also on their
expectations. This model maps collective action problems onto an iterated n-person
prisoners’ dilemma in an uncertain world. Individuals interact dynamically, making
decisions based both on individual preferences and on their expectations as to how their
choices will affect other agents in the future. This is a significant departure from previous
studies of collective action problems in which the finiteness of the interaction is the only
shadow cast by the future.
Using a dynamical formulation of these interactions we derived the magnitudes of
group sizes that are capable of supporting cooperation and established the existence of
regimes with multiple Nash equilibria for groups of identical agents. Extensive computer
experiments also allowed us to confirm the analytically derived behavioral diagrams
whose distinct regions correspond to different resolutions of the collective action problem.
We also studied stochastic fluctuations in the number of individuals cooperating
or defecting using a thermodynamic-like formalism. This allowed us to discover the
existence of very long transient states in which collaboration can persist in groups whose
sizes are too big to support it indefinitely. Moreover, the onset of overall cooperation
takes place in a sudden and unexpected way. Likewise, defection can appear out of
nowhere in very large, previously cooperating, groups. These outbreaks, which were
also confirmed by computer experiments, mark the end of long transient states in which
defection or cooperation persists in groups that cannot sustain it indefinitely. Since these
discontinuities are not overly sensitive to the analytical form of the expectations, we
expect that they might be observed in more complex social settings.
Relaxing the assumption that the individuals were identical in their beliefs and
preferences, we then elucidated the effect of diversity on the dynamics of collective
action. One type of diversity, represented as a spread about some common average belief
among individuals, was shown to act as a source of extra uncertainty, thus shortening the
time to an outbreak without affecting its abrupt nature. A second form of diversity, which
occurs when a group consists of several subgroups each with its own distinct beliefs was
also studied. In this case, we showed that cooperation (or defection) can be achieved
by the group in demarcated stages. In general, an additional metastable state appears for
each new subdivision within the group.
The implications of this work for the study of cooperation in organizations can
be briefly stated. In order to achieve spontaneous cooperation on a global scale, an
organization should be structured into small subunits made up of individuals with a well-
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designed diversity of beliefs. The small size of the units allows for the emergence
of sustained cooperation; diversity hastens its appearance. To the extent that these
two elements, smallness and diversity, can be preserved in a hierarchical structure, we
anticipate that sustained cooperation can be achieved in more complex systems as well.
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